Highlighted Articles in this Blog

Highlighted Articles:

• Observations On CMBS Spread Forecasts
• My Suggestions on TARP
  
• Solving the Bad Asset Pricing Problem

My Other Blog: Some Useful Information

Note: Views expressed in my writings are solely my own.

Restarting CMBS Lending

By Malay Bansal

The DDR deal, the first CMBS deal after nearly eighteen months, was ten times oversubscribed. The following two deals also saw good demand even though they did not allow for TALF financing. So, clearly, there is good demand for CMBS bonds backed by well underwritten loans. Also, borrowers clearly want loans if they can get a reasonable cost of financing. DDR loan, with about 4.25% all-in cost of financing for the borrower, showed that a low cost of financing is possible even in the current market. Yet, prospects of a conduit style multi-borrower deal seem bleak at the moment. Any CMBS deals that come to market are expected to be single-borrower deals, as in those deals the borrower takes the market risk and not the underwriter doing the deal. Securitization shops do not want to take the spread risk while aggregating the pool because there is no way to hedge that risk, and so are unable to originate loans even though many are eager to restart their lending operation. If they do originate loans without ability to hedge, they would require much wider spread resulting in higher cost of financing than borrowers would find attractive.

Inability to hedge loans while aggregating a pool for securitization is one of the biggest obstacles preventing restarting of conduit lending for commercial real estate properties.

In the past, the conduit originators were able to hedge loans while they were aggregating a pool big enough to securitize. So, they were not exposed to risk from changes in interest rates and bond spreads between loan origination and securitization. The hedging generally involved hedging the interest rate risk by selling interest rate swaps, and hedging the bond spread risk by using Total Return Swaps on Lehman or Bank Of America CMBS indices. These indices allowed loan originators to effectively sell their risk to investors who wanted to gain exposure to CMBS in their investment portfolio. They sold the risk when they originated the loan, and bought it back when they securitized the loans. The hedge worked because spreads on new CMBS deals moved in parallel with the spreads on existing deals.

The problem now is that those indices are no longer appropriate for hedging, especially for new origination loans, because of two problems. One, ratings downgrades have impacted the composition of the indices. Second, and more important, the spreads on new bonds with newly underwritten loans cannot be expected to move in tandem with spreads on old bonds with the old underwriting. This lack of correlation between the two spreads makes the old bonds or indices unusable as a hedge for newly originated better quality loans.

What this means is that to hedge new loans with better underwriting, originators need bonds with better underwritten new loans. In other words, to originate loans, you need bonds with new underwriting, and to create bonds with better underwritten loans, you need the better underwritten loans. That’s the chicken-and-egg type problem of loan aggregation. This is what has prevented loan origination from restarting once the spreads on old bonds widened out.

To solve this chicken-and-egg problem, back in February 2008, I made a suggestion to Markit, which administers the CMBX indices. My suggestion was to create a new CMBX type of index based on future deals that met minimum credit quality. Only deals which met pre-set criteria based on LTV, DSCR, and other credit parameters would be eligible to be included in the new index. Trading of the index would have allowed the market to determine spreads on bonds backed by good newly originated loans, and provided a hedging mechanism for loan originators, solving the chicken-and-egg problem.

Markit discussed the idea in a conference call with the trading desks, but it was thought to require too much work to create, when dealers were busy with the market volatility. Also, the idea was complicated, since it was based on future deals. Additionally, the CMBX is based on CDS (Credit Default Swap), and cash and CDS markets do not always move together, and so the hedge would not have been as good as Total Return Swaps on cash bonds.

Luckily, things have changed since then.

One, MarkIt has created new indices called TRX, which are based on Total Return Swaps on cash CMBS spreads, which will be a much better hedge for loans than a CMBX or CDS type of hedge. Total Return Swaps are what many originators used in the past to hedge the credit spreads.

Second, new deals with newly underwritten loans have been done and exist now. So, it is not necessary to base the index on future deals, avoiding a lot of complexity. That simplifies things considerably.

One solution to the hedging problem for newly originated loans is to create a new TRX index based on the new deals. It will allow the originators to sell risk, and will allow all the investors (many who did not get any allocations in the over-subscribed deals that have been done recently) to get exposure to new CMBS bonds.

Some may argue that three deals is not enough diversity to create an index. Admittedly, it would be better to have a more diverse pool of deals for the index. However, even with just three deals, the index will allow many originators considering starting origination to solve the chicken-and-egg problem. Also, this by itself will not solve all the problems the CMBS industry is facing. Yet, it will be better to have something, even if it is not perfect, than to have nothing at all.

I urge Markit and the dealers to make available a new index that will be attractive to both loan originators and investors, and just might help solve one of the major roadblocks preventing restarting of CMBS lending.

Note: This article was published on Seeking Alpha.

Will wide media coverage of Peter Cooper Village/Stuy Town make CMBS losses more likely?

By Malay Bansal

Wide media coverage of the Peter Cooper Village & Stuy Town loan might make a CMBS loss on that loan more likely.

Media has widely reported that the value of Peter Cooper Village/Stuy Town properties, which were purchased for $5.4 Bn in Nov 2006, is now estimated to be less than $2 Bn. Normally the low estimates do not matter. What really matters is the highest bid or the price one – just one – buyer is willing to pay. Valuation of properties like this is not totally a science, and it is entirely possible for one buyer to put a higher valuation on it than others based on their view of possible upside. However, in this case, such a wide dissemination and knowledge of the $1.8 to $1.9 current valuation numbers, might make it difficult for someone to put a higher valuation on it, even if they otherwise might have done so. With reserves running out, special servicer may not be too keen on taking over the properties.  That will make it more likely that they will end up accepting losses on the $3 Bn senior loan, included in five different CMBS deals, and modifying it for whoever emerges as the owner going forward.

Note: This article was published on Seeking Alpha, and is based on my comments originally reported a week earlier by Housing Wire.

Fed’s Chicken-and-Egg Problem in CMBS & Two Suggestions on TALF

 

By Malay Bansal

Originators want to originate new loans, investors want to buy bonds with new conservatively underwritten loans, Treasury & Federal Reserve want the new issue CMBS market to start, borrowers certainly want to take out new loans to refinance maturing loans, and yet, four months after the Treasury launched the program, not one new issue CMBS deal has come to the market.

This highlights the chicken-and-egg type problem that the CMBS market faces. Everyone knows that the new origination will be of higher quality and so should have tighter spreads than the legacy bonds. Yet, lacking an efficient hedge, all that the originators have for indication of spreads are the legacy bonds, which are still too wide for new issue deals. In other words, originators are looking for tighter and stable bond spreads to originate, and market is looking for new collateral for tighter spreads – sort of a chicken-and-egg type problem.

One solution is to wait till legacy bond spreads tighten and stabilize, giving loan originators more confidence, but that might mean new issue TALF program may not get much traction before it ends. Another approach is to accelerate the legacy TALF program by removing some of the uncertainty that borrowers in that program face today. There are two easy to implement steps that will be helpful and allow investors to buy bonds throughout the month, rather than waiting till just before the TALF subscription date. First, the price used for calculating loan amount can be adjusted for interest rate movement from purchase date to the subscription date, and second, Federal reserve can allow potential borrowers to submit a list of potential bonds for purchase before actually buying the bonds, with approvals announced two or three weeks before the subscription date. Pre-approval of bonds will be almost as effective as disclosure by the Fed of their bond approval (or rejection) methodology, which more and more market participants are asking  the Fed to do, and which Fed has been reluctant to do, probably because doing so might reduce their flexibility.

Note: A version of this article was published on Seeking Alpha.

Observations on CMBS Spread Forecasts

By Malay Bansal

It’s always interesting to analyze forecasts about future spreads and yields. CMBS industry’s weekly newsletter, Commercial Mortgage Alert publishes predictions on future CMBS spreads every January & July. I have always liked to look at them to see what market participants are thinking, and if any interesting insights can be gleaned from their predictions.

The table below is the latest set of forecasts published. It shows predictions from ten industry participants on where recent vintage (i.e. 2006 to 2008 deals) CMBS spreads will be six months later. Some observations follow.

Let’s start with the averages. The average prediction suggests that, six months later, Super Senior AAAs will be tighter but BBB spreads will be wider. Credit curve will be steeper. That makes sense and reflects the belief of many that CMBS will face losses but not to an extent that it will impact super-senior AAA tranches in most deals. Range of 350 to 975 is wide, but not that much given the current uncertainty.

The BBB forecasts are more interesting – with a really wide range from 3500 to 17500. The majority expects spreads to widen, but the widest spread is mine. Why am I negative on recent vintage BBB and BBB- bonds? My reasons are not different from others, and so are not that interesting (and hence listed as a footnote at the end). What is interesting to me is a question I have been asked multiple times – if I am twice as negative as the average and why? With average prediction of 8473, and my prediction of 17500, it is a fair question. So, let’s examine that in a little more detail.

The current spread for BBB is listed as 6500 bps over swaps. If we take a single bond as a representative of the sector, that spread implies a yield of about 68.5%, a price of about 10.40, and Modified Duration of 1.6. The bond has a coupon of 6%. If you buy the bond at a price of 10.40, at the end of second year, you would have received 12.00 in coupon payments (2 years at 6%/year), which is all of original price you paid for the bond plus about 15%. In effect, the market is saying that it expects these bonds to receive just about two years of coupon, and not much else after that. In other words, the market price implies that it expects these bonds to be wiped out after about two years.

If you logically follow that belief, then after 6 months, an owner of the bond would have received 3.00 and  should be expecting one and a half year more of cashflows. So the price of the bond would be roughly 3.00 lower than 10.40, or 7.40. Indeed, that price is not too far from what the average spread prediction would result in. In other words, the average spread prediction of 8475 implies that the market will be expecting about 1.5 years of cash flows. In comparison, my prediction of 17500 assumed expectation of only 1.0 year of cashflows. So, I am not twice as negative as the average, just a little more – difference being 6 months in cashflows for seven year bonds. So, why such a big difference in spreads? That has to do with the current low prices of these bonds, and the fact that as bond prices decrease, duration decreases too. For a bond priced at 10.00 with a duration of 1.0, a 100 basis point change in yield results in a change in price of 1%, or just 0.10 (1% of 10.00). As duration decreases, it takes a larger change in spreads to make a difference in price. That bond math explains the big difference in spreads, but that is not the important point. The important observation here is that, whether expectation is for 12 or 18 (or something in between) months of remaining cash flows, it reflects a pretty negative expectation for bonds that will have about 7 years remaining to maturity.

Despite the negative expectations, there is another point that is important to keep in mind – it is a simple one but is often missed by many, especially in media reports – CMBS and property markets are linked, but are separate markets, and one can be way ahead of the other. It is entirely possible for commercial real estate to face problems at property level, but CMBS BBBs to tighten. That is another way of saying that, despite all the issues mentioned, it is entirely possible that the majority may turn out to be wrong. Note that there were two predictions for tighter spreads on BBB. There are scenarios possible under which losses in CMBS will be limited even with problems at property level, and that will logically lead to a significant rally in the BBB tranches. A lot will depend on government and industry steps, some of which are helping tighten spreads, but I do not yet see steps that make the more optimistic scenarios likely. Apparently, neither does the majority.

Here is perhaps the most important point of this article: if you are not sure and have doubts about extent of losses in BBB and BBB- classes, then AA and single-A classes at prices in 20s with subordinations of 9.8% and 7.5% (and same about 6% coupon), have to be a bargain, especially if you can do the credit work and pick the right deals.

Note: The views in this article and my spread predictions in the Commercial Mortgage Alert article referenced are solely my own.

___________________________________

Footnote:

Some Reasons for being negative on recent vintage BBB & BBB-  CMBS

Consider the following facts and opinions:

• Commercial property values are down 34.8% from Oct 2007 peak, as measured by the Moody’s/REAL CPPI index.
• Average subordinations for 2007 BBB and BBB- were 4.20% and 3.10% respectively. That means losses of approximately 4.20% and 5.3% will result in complete write-down of these tranches.
• Appraisal reductions can lead to interest shortfalls (via ASERs) and can stop cash flows to the subordinate bonds long before actual write-downs.
• It remains very difficult to refinance maturing loans, especially those with larger sizes. 29% of all loans that matured this year remain outstanding. Of the 5 year loans that matured this year, only 50% were refinanced. Number of CMBS loans maturing increases dramatically from $18 Bn this year to 35 Bn next year, and 56 Bn two years later.
• Loans going in special servicing generally require new appraisal and can result in appraisal reductions before actual losses. According to Fitch, loans in special servicing are expected to increase from current $50 Bn to 100 Bn (or about 14% of total outstanding universe on average) by year end. In addition to losses, the special servicing fee of 0.25% on loans in special servicing will reduce cash flow to bonds increasing interest shortfalls.
• Among just the large loans, about 15 Bn with pro-forma underwriting with expectation of higher cash flows have not realized the expected increased cash flows. They are paying debt service at present, but may default in next 6 to 12 months once the interest reserves are completely used up.
• Over next few years, partial IO loans will start to amortize after the initial 2 to 5 year interest-only period. Increased debt service may not be fully covered by property cash flow, leading to defaults. In 2007 vintage, about 32% loans were partial IO along with 53% that were interest only to maturity.
• Delinquencies are still very low, even for loans with cash flow not covering debt service. In 2007 vintage, roughly 14.7% loans have debt service coverage level of less than 1.0.
• Overall delinquencies are expected to increase. For example, JP research expects aggregate delinquency to reach 4% by year end, and 10% by end of 2010. DB research expects delinquencies to reach 6-7% by end of 2009 in aggregate, and high-teens to 20% for 2007 vintage. REIS expects delinquencies to possibly reach 7% by year-end. Last time delinquencies were higher than 6% was in 1991 after the S&L crisis.
• Significant losses are expected in the recent vintage deals, even before maturity of loans. For example, DB research expects term losses, i.e. losses before maturity, to be 4.3 to 6.3% for the entire CMBS universe (with total cumulative losses of 10% including those at maturity), and 8.4% to 12.1% for the 2007 vintage. Fitch expects cumulative losses on 2006 to 2008 vintage deals of approximately 8% (maybe more than 14% for some 2007 deals), with 25% of loans possibly defaulting before maturity.

Make Your Own Opinion About Commercial Real Estate

By Malay Bansal

Note: This write-up was published on Seeking Alpha website and was selected as an Editor’s Pick article.

Much has been written about the issues faced by Commercial Real Estate, extent of losses the CMBS bonds will sustain, whether the TALF, PPIP and other government programs will help, and if the commercial real estate market is showing signs of bottoming or is going to keep declining a lot more. There are various views which all seem plausible. If you are not professionally involved in real estate, or if you do not already have a definite view, how do you go about developing your own opinion? This article is an attempt to help with that process.

First step in the process is defining the problem being faced by the CRE market. It is a complex problem and yet the best description of it I have seen is a simple one sentence comment reportedly made by a panelist at a recent industry conference organized by CMSA:

“We have gone from a 6% Cap, 80% LTV world to a 8% Cap, 60% LTV world.”

That is another way of saying the CRE market faces a double-whammy of falling prices and reduced availability of debt, but the use of numbers in this short one sentence elegantly and succinctly captures the essence of the problem. A simple example will help explain.

Let’s take a commercial property, say an office. It is year 2006, property generates $600,000 in rental income per year, and cap rates are 6%. That results in value of $10 mm (600K/6%). In an 80 LTV world, Larry the Landlord buys the building for 10 mm, borrowing 8 mm (80% of 10 mm) for 5 years from a CMBS lender, and using 2 mm of his own money. Now fast forward to a time closer to loan maturity. In the new world, cap rates are 8%, so the new value is lower at 7.5 mm (600K/8%), and the new loan amount is 4.5 mm (60% of 7.5 mm). To refinance, Larry needs to pay off 8 mm, but can only get 4.5 mm in new loan. So, he needs to come up with 3.5 mm. If he has that money or can raise it from somewhere else, he can refinance the old loan and continue to own the property.

If Larry can not raise the additional amount, or if he does not think that it is economically worthwhile to do so, then the loan is foreclosed, and one option for the lender is to sell the property. Ideally, the property can be sold for 7.5 mm, the new value. In the worst case, there should be plenty of buyers at 4.5 mm (since one can buy the property no money down using the 4.5 mm debt available in the new world). The actual price will be somewhere between the two depending on how many buyers are there with cash available to buy, and what is their view of real estate prices in future.

By using the above numbers, we can quantify the range of expected losses in cases of sales:

	Decline or Loss	%Decline or Loss
Property Prices	2.5 to 5.5 mm	25% to 55%.
Borrower’s Equity	2 mm	100%
CMBS debt	500K to 3.5 mm	6.25% to 43.75%

If you layer in other factors, for example, if you assume that building’s cash flow decreases by 15% due to higher vacancy or lower rental rates (or the actual rent is lower than the assumed rent in aggressive underwriting), the numbers become worse:

New cashflow is 510 K, which results in new value of 6.375 mm, and new loan of 3.825 mm. With a new buyer paying something between 3.825 mm and 6.375 mm in case of a sale, the range of losses is:

	Decline or Loss	%Decline or Loss
Property Prices	3.625 to 6.175 mm	36.25% to 61.75%.
Borrower’s Equity	2mm	100%
CMBS debt	1.625 to 4.175 mm	20.31% to 52.19%

Broad ranges for sure, and you can quibble with the cap rates or LTVs,  or the fact that this simple analysis ignores other expenses and complexities, but these are back-of-the-envelope numbers, and give you an idea. For CMBS deals, you also need an estimate on how many loans in a given deal will default. If you assume approximately 40% losses on defaulting loans, then defaults on 20% of loans in the pool will result in 8% losses on CMBS deals, which is somewhere in the middle of the range of losses being predicted by many of the market participants.

Loan extensions can postpone the problem, but not necessarily avoid it, unless the property prices go back to the old levels quickly, which no one expects.

Looking at the example above, one can clearly see the importance and impact of availability of debt. If debt up to 80 LTV were to become available again, that will narrow the ranges above significantly. Clearly, programs like TALF and PPIP that help increase availability of debt are helpful and important. But, they do not solve all problems. They do not help with the decline in value. That pain has to be taken, even though many are trying to ignore it. The current low transaction volume environment reduces confidence in valuations, but eventually volume and clarity on new valuations will both increase. Those who own commercial real estate property with a lot of debt and can not carry it through the downturn will suffer losses they have not recognized yet. But those who have cash and can buy properties at cheap levels in distressed sales will benefit. As always, it will be important to analyze and understand not just the sector, but the individual investments being considered.

Interesting Features in Legacy CMBS TALF

By Malay Bansal

Treasury announced details of the Legacy TALF program for CMBS on May 19th. It had several interesting features.

One that surprised some in  the market was a turbo feature that limits the payment to TALF borrowers and uses the excess interest to pay down the TALF loan. To me that is a very important and necessary requirement, and I had that in my Oct 2008 suggestions.

What I found interesting was the idea of making the haircut based on Par rather than Market value. Makes the haircut adjust automatically for changes in market value and simplifies administration. Clever idea.

What Would the TARP Public-Private Partnership Look Like?

By Malay Bansal

Note: This write-up was published on the Seeking Alpha website here.

On Feb 10, when the Treasury secretary Tim Geithner announced the Financial Stability Plan, which included a Public-Private Partnership Fund to remove bad assets from banks’ balance sheets, the markets reacted very negatively because of disappointment with lack of details on the plan. According to news items, the announcement of details is imminent now. Given the magnitude of reaction to the original announcement, many in the market await the plan details with interest.

That Fed should provide financing to private investors, instead of buying toxic assets itself (to help remove these troubled assets from banks balance sheets), is accepted by a lot more people now. By involving private capital, the government can minimize use of public funds and provide a mechanism for determination of fair prices for these toxic assets based on competitive bids by multiple private investors (my follow-up and original articles describe the reasoning).

Although no details have been announced, and the details are likely to change till the program is finalized, recent news articles have suggested that the administration is considering setting up multiple Investment Funds, with a Private Investment Manager running each fund. The Investment Managers will put up some equity, and government will provide financing to the funds. The private investment managers would run the funds, deciding which assets to buy and what prices to pay. Since there would be a limited number of funds, they would most likely target all types of assets rather than focusing on one specific type of distressed security. In addition to providing financing, government will also add equity to the fund alongside the private manager and would share in any gain or loss with the manager.

Even this simple description has couple of factors that are significant and bear watching.

First, if the government sets up a limited number of Investment Funds, it will reduce the competition for assets. One of the major results desired is for the selling banks to get the highest rational price possible for these assets to avoid further losses to them. With just five to ten investment funds bidding, the banks will be less likely to get the highest possible price. Instead of setting up just a few Investment Funds, the financing should be available to all investors – whoever has the highest bid on the legacy assets being sold should get it. Let various people and companies who have expertise in different types of assets assess and bid on them. Greater expertise and competition will result in higher sale prices.

Second, the idea of government putting in equity in these Investment Funds is less than ideal. The logic for doing this, of course, is that the private investors will benefit from the plan, and so the public should benefit too by investing alongside them. However, the goal of government in this endeavor is not to take investment risk for any potential gain, and Treasury should not be risking public money in this manner.

Also, saying that public should benefit alongside the private investors implies that the private investors are getting a sweet deal from the government and would make outsized returns by using government’s help. Suggesting this would only generate opposition to the plan from the public. Reality is, and should be, that the private investor should be taking the first loss risk. No public money should be at risk of loss till the private investor has been fully wiped out. This risk is what justifies the higher returns the private investors will get, if the asset performance does not turn out to be worse than pricing assumptions. Their returns will be less than expected if the asset performance is worse than assumed at the time of pricing. It will be very important to explain this aspect to lawmakers and general public to promote understanding and to avoid criticism and opposition of the plan. Private investors should not be asking the government for additional guarantees, and should clarify the risks they are taking to avoid backlash from general public and lawmakers.

Another justification offered for Treasury to put in equity in these funds may be to increase the total amount of funds used to buy toxic assets. Using simple numbers of let’s say 50% equity and 50% financing, the argument may be that, if the private investor puts $100 million, then government will put in another $100 mm resulting in total $200 mm of capital. If however, the government also put in $100 mm of equity alongside the $100 mm of private investor’s capital, then the total of $400 mm will be available to purchase assets. However, this logic is flawed. In this example, the government will be putting in $300 mm of capital and private investor $100 mm. If the government only provided financing, using the same 50% equity and 50% financing, it will be able to get total of $600 mm to purchase assets.

The TALF program has undergone significant changes since it was originally announced. In fact, the Public-Private Program could even be modeled along somewhat similar lines.

The Public-Private Partnership program will play an important role in the cleanup of bank balance sheets, which is one of the prerequisites for eventual return to normalcy for credit markets. We watch with interest what it would look like when the Treasury announces the details.

Geithner Announces Financial Stability Plan

By Malay Bansal

Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner announced the long-awaited toxic asset plan, but the market is disappointed by lack of details.

The plan is headed in the right direction but  implementation details will be important.

Extract from Treasury’s 10-Feb-2009 Fact Sheet on the Financial Stability Plan:

FACT SHEET

FINANCIAL STABILITY PLAN

1. Public-Private Investment Fund: One aspect of a full arsenal approach is the need to provide greater means for financial institutions to cleanse their balance sheets of what are often referred to as “legacy” assets.  Many proposals designed to achieve this are complicated both by their sole reliance on public purchasing and the difficulties in pricing assets.  Working together in partnership with the FDIC and the Federal Reserve, the Treasury Department will initiate a Public-Private Investment Fund that takes a new approach.

• Public-Private Capital: This new program will be designed with a public-private financing component, which could involve putting public or private capital side-by-side and using public financing to leverage private capital on an initial scale of up to $500 billion, with the potential to expand up to $1 trillion.
• Private Sector Pricing of Assets: Because the new program is designed to bring private sector equity contributions to make large-scale asset purchases, it not only minimizes public capital and maximizes private capital: it allows private sector buyers to determine the price for current troubled and previously illiquid assets

Solving the Bad Asset Pricing Problem

Note: This write-up was published on the Seeking Alpha website here. It was a follow-up to the original suggestions, sent to Treasury & FRB in Oct 2008, which proposed a plan similar to the TALF and PPIP programs, months before Treasury and others came around to the idea.

By Malay Bansal

The Original TARP plan and the Aggregator Bad Bank ideas both have one major flaw: lack of a mechanism to determine appropriate prices for bad assets. Here is an approach to tackle this pricing issue. This approach also gets more bang for the buck for the Treasury by involving private capital in buying of these assets. More clarity in pricing and involvement of private investors are desperately needed for markets to return to normalcy.

There are already a lot of private investors who have raised significant amounts of money to invest in distressed assets. However, a lot of this cash has not been invested yet. Part of the reason is that they desire lower prices to get their returns to higher target levels than what they can get at present. Sellers, on the other hand, are often not ready to sell at even lower than current prices, especially when they believe that prices are already too cheap based on fundamentals. This has led to a stand-off which is leaving these assets on bank balance-sheets. So long as these assets stay on their balance-sheets and uncertainty about their prices continues, banks facing mark-to-market losses can not focus on restarting lending in these markets again.

Lower asset prices is one way private investors can get higher returns. The other method is if they can get financing for buying these distressed assets. If for example, they can get 50% financing on purchase price of assets, they can buy twice the amount of assets they could buy without the financing, thus roughly doubling their returns (minus the cost of financing). This will allow them to pay higher prices for assets and still earn their target returns.

In the current environment, financing is generally not available to investors in these assets. Given that financing can increase returns significantly, it is especially valued by investors at present. And that is what provides the solution to the pricing problem, and can ensure that the banks get the highest prices possible for these assets today, without the risk of any future Mark-To-Market (or actual) losses.

To attract private investors to buy distressed assets, the Treasury can offer to provide financing to private buyers. Prospect of higher returns, especially in an environment where returns on other assets are low, will attract lot of investors to the sector. However, financing will be provided to the buyer who has the highest bid on a given set of assets. That is important. The bidding process creates a mechanism for determining a fair market value for these assets. This plan will allow participation by numerous large and not-so-large investors, not just a few large investors selected by the Treasury. If the bid is too low and the bidder can make an exceptionally high return, another investor is likely to step in with a higher bid, if the bidding process is transparent and open to everyone. Different investors have expertise in different products. Those with the best expertise in the assets being offered will be able to value these assets and bid more aggressively. Since there will be multiple buyers competing to buy assets, with their own capital at risk, the plan would help in determination of fair market prices for distressed assets (instead of a situation in which TARP/Aggregator Bank manager is the only buyer). This bidding process also ensures the banks get the highest price possible for their assets in the current environment. If none of the bids are high enough, the bank is not required to sell, and can retain their assets. This ensures that banks are not forced by the program to sell assets at too low a price. If they choose to sell, their balance-sheet is cleared of these assets, and there is no future claw-back or liability related to these assets for them – the assets will be owned by a third party. They can go on to focus on other things.

Any cash flow received from the assets will be used first to pay interest to the Treasury and the private investors. Then, it will be used to pay principal back to the Treasury. Private investors will not get any of their principal back till Treasury has been paid back completely. The interest paid to private investors will be small (perhaps 4 to 5% range on their invested funds, not the face amount of securities) and will be meant to cover their expenses. Majority of their return will come at the back-end, their higher risk reflecting their higher returns. This priority for paying back Treasury funds first will protect public funds by decreasing the probability and amount of any potential losses on these assets.

Also, for home mortgage backed assets, Treasury can help homeowner mortgage-holders facing difficulty by requiring recipients of financing to agree to certain pre-specified steps to help homeowners in loan workouts.

Providing financing, instead of buying assets itself, provides more bang for the buck for the Treasury. As an example, if the Treasury offered 50% financing on AAA assets, and it has $100 Bn allocated to the program, the program will clear $200 Bn of assets from bank balance sheets. If the treasury used the funds to buy the assets itself, it will be able to remove only $100 Bn of assets from the banks’ balance sheets. Also, it reduces the risk of loss on these assets for public funds, since Treasury will be paid first and private investors will be bear the loss before the Treasury takes any hit.

Since private investors, who will have their own capital at risk before Treasury’s capital, will be buying and managing the assets, the Treasury will not need to build as big an infrastructure as it will need if it were to buy the assets itself. Nor will it need to pay management fees to third-party managers. Also, by using the private sector, this program can be ramped up much more quickly.

To achieve the highest rational prices, the bidding process must allow wide participation by large & small investors (bids should be requested for portfolio sizes that do not discourage small to medium size investors), amount and cost of financing should be known in advance of bidding (will likely be different for different pools and can be announced for each portfolio when it is put up for bid – treasury can even ask for multiple bids for different amounts of financing), and private capital must be at risk while protecting public funds (otherwise plan may face opposition from public).

I had originally included this suggestion among a few I had made to the Federal Reserve and Treasury officials in October after the original TARP plan was announced. I was happy to see the announcement of TALF, which will provide financing for new origination. However, financing for existing distressed assets will help clear the bank balance sheets of these assets, which is needed before banks are likely to increase originating new loans. Also, current Treasury plans do not include the Commercial Real Estate sector. It should be included before the issues in the sector escalate and become much bigger, as it will have significant impact on smaller regional banks,that hold a lot of commercial real estate debt.

No single step will solve all the problems. Neither will this one, and it should be one of many approaches. But this approach can be effective since it will start the process for establishing prices for distressed assets, involving private capital in solving the problem, and cleaning up bank balance sheets, which are all prerequisites for eventual return to normalcy in the credit markets.

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Extract from my original Suggestions sent in Oct 2008 to the Treasury & the FRB (the write-up was mentioned in the NY Times Executive Suite column by Joe Nocera and the complete document is available at nytimes.com here). My writeup included the Turbo concept of using part of excess interest to pay down loan principal, which was included in the TALF announcement on Legacy CMBS on May 19, 2009).

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Suggestions for Additional Steps for Tackling the Credit Crisis

By Malay Bansal (malay.bansal@gmail.com)

Oct 19, 2008

2. Better use of part of TARP Funds targeted to buy mortgage assets: Treasury can partner with private buyers instead of buying assets itself.

• Will increase efficiency by tapping private funds. There is a lot of capital waiting to be invested in distressed assets, but has not been invested yet as prices need to be lower to achieve targeted returns without leverage.
• Treasury can lend to or partner with private buyers of distressed mortgage assets with terms like the following:
  • Treasury will put up 50% and the private buyer will put up 50%, with Treasury’s interest being the senior interest.
  • Funds will be used to buy distressed mortgages and securities at a discount from various large and small banks and financial institutions.
  • Mortgage payments from purchased assets will be used in sequential order to (i) pay 5% interest to Treasury, (ii) 5% interest to the Private buyer, (iii) principal to Treasury, (iv) principal to the Private buyer, and finally (v) all residual to the private buyer as its return for the risk. This ensures that Treasury gets its money back first.
• The 5% interest for Treasury will apply for 5 years. After that, it will increase by 0.5% every year till it reaches 9%. Interest for private buyer will stay at 5%.
• Those taking the loan from treasury will need to agree to change mortgage terms to help homeowners including giving borrowers the option to (i) increase loan term by 5 to 10 years, and (ii) prepay loans at any time without penalty (any existing prepay penalties will be waived). Other terms to help homeowners may be included.
• Treasury will offer mortgage assets from banks for bids. The private buyer with the highest bid will get funds from Treasury. Banks will have option of accepting the highest bid or keeping the assets themselves.
• This type of plan will allow participation by numerous large and not-so-large investors. Since there will be multiple buyers competing to buy assets, with their own capital at risk, the plan would help in determination of fair market prices for distressed assets (instead of a situation in which TARP manager is the only buyer).
• This program can run in parallel with direct purchases of assets by treasury, or can be used to sell off assets purchased by Treasury at a future date.